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BOOK REVIEWS 
Oots, Kent Layne. A Political Organization Approach to Transnational 
Terrorism. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986. 
A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism is a 
sober and considered, although somewhat modest, contribution to the 
burgeoning field of "terrorism studies." Oots begins with the premise 
that terrorist groups are political organizations (political because they 
seek to provide public goods) that "are rational actors in the sense that 
they [will] act in a manner which they believe will maximize their 
utility...."1 Oots, of course, is not the first scholar to approach terrorist 
organizations as rational actors that seek to maximize utility. The 
strength of this assumption is that it enables students of terrorism to 
draw upon the insights of two fairly well-developed literatures in political 
sciences: rational choice and interest group behavior. In doing so, such 
an assumption counteracts the all too common tendency to dismiss ter-
rorism as too unusual or inappropriate for scholarly inquiry. 
Oots is primarily concerned with investigating how two major 
organizational variables — the size of terrorist groups and the presence 
of coalitions among them — affect the behavior of terrorist organiza-
tions. From those variables, Oots develops a set of hypotheses that he 
tests against the ITERATE II data base, which contains empirical infor-
mation on terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1977. As Oots himself notes, 
his conclusions suffer from infirmities in the data base, infirmities that 
include incomplete coverage of terrorist incidents in Eastern Europe and 
perhaps more importantly, coverage of incidents only through 1977. 
Even with those limits, Oots' findings must still be regarded as 
modest. Oots' central hypothesis concerning group size is that "the more 
difficult [a terrorist] act is logistically, the larger the group required to 
carry out the act."2 Coupled with this hypothesis are several others, one 
of which predicts that large acting groups of terrorists will be less likely 
than normal or smaller sized groups to commit a successful act. Another 
proposition is that large group "negotiated" acts (such as kidnappings, 
barricade and hostage episodes, and hijackings) are more likely to end in 
violence to people or property than are small group acts. 
In general, Oots' data support the first of these hypotheses: more 
"difficult" acts are more likely to be committed by a larger group. 
However, there is little or no evidence to support Oots' hypothesis that 
larger groups meet with less success in completing terrorist acts. Instead, 
"most terrorist acts are carried to logistical completion regardless of the 
size of the acting group."3 Likewise, the data only marginally support 
the hypothesis that large group acts are more likely to result in violence, 
and instead suggest that violence is more likely to result during or 
because of acts committed by intermediate sized organizations. 
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The findings with regard to coalitions among terrorist organizations 
are more interesting, although once again they are severely limited by the 
failure of the date base to include terrorist incidents after 1977. As a 
result, Oots is unable to consider more recent cases of operation, such as 
the well publicized alliance between the Red Army Faction and Action 
Directe. Nonetheless, for the period between 1968 and 1977, Oots con-
cludes that operational cooperation among terrorist groups was infre-
quent, if not rare. Further, although Oots finds that there were "working 
partnerships" among certain terrorist groups, "Close working partner-
ships are apparently more frequent among Palestinian groups,"4 he 
notes that his data does little to support claims that an international ter-
rorist network exists. Those coalitions that did occur were usually of 
short duration, as Oots predicted. Finally, there is limited evidence to 
suggest that coalitional acts were more likely to end in violence than 
single group acts. 
In sum, scholars will find this book handicapped by limits inherent 
in the ITERATE II data base, and the work is perhaps too narrow and 
technical to interest nonspecialists. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the 
limited nature of its findings (and tedious first chapter that recounts 
previous work in the field), the book represents an admirable effort to 
bring discipline and sophistication to the literature on terrorism. 
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The negotiations for the restoration of the Panama Canal Zone to 
Panama, during the Carter Administration, the victory of the Sandinista 
revolution in Nicaragua and the long insurrection in El Salvador have all 
projected studies in Central American politics, economics, sociology and 
history into the forefront of scholarly activity during the past seven 
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